27 thoughts on “Daniel Dennett – Freedom Evolves – a Dangerous Idea Part 5”
The state of the universe, from instant to instant, is never the same. Yes, we are made up of the same atoms as exist everywhere in the universe, but in us they are put together to make you, me, the person. As persons, we have the freedom to choose. We do not need to attribute this ability to a 'sky hook' which connects us to a universal 'res cogitans.' Evolution has designed an intelligent being and (like Brunelleschi's crane) it gives us that extension–the ability to predict the future.
Predict the future? I am not sure about that. Understand the past yes. And understanding the past helps us deal with the future better, also true. But it sees stretching to say it actually helps us predict the future. Evolution makes no prophecies.
Thanks for the correction. On second thought, it seems to me a bit of an ambitious proposition to suggest that we actually predict anything about the future. I guess we can be somewhat accurate in predicting the outcomes of some experiments in science. As individuals in the world, we can try to project as many possible scenarios of events which haven't yet happened. There is a quality about emergent phenomena that sets the stage for either further natural or cognitive selective processes.
can anyone help? im still not sure i understand (or agree with) his reasons for saying that its pointless to think about re-living conditions precisley the same because we learn nothing.
ive always thought of it like that. i think that if the conditions were 100% as they were when i woke up this morning i would always have choosen to skip breakfast. im not sure if he's is saying this isnt true or not?
any ideas?
I have good reason to agree with what he says here. If conditions where exactly the way they where, then indeed you would not even be aware that the situation is repeating itself, because in the original, you did not have a memory of going through the same motions. When people speak about conditions exactly the way they where, they are usually speaking about an extremely similar circumstance.
yes. its not that im disagreeing. its just that i dont fully see what his point is?
all im getting from this, and your comment, is that its not a viable way of testing determinism or free will by using the 'if the conditions were the same!' senario, which i completely agree with. im just not sure why he is saying that its actaully not true! that if conditions theoretically could be done the same the result would be the same. i believe it would. maybe i understand him wrong tho?
I am not understanding your question. Anyway we are not testing determinism here. He is pointing to the fact that determinism and free-will are compatible.
sorry im not putting this into words very well.
i guess im just trying to be honest and admit that as much as im trying to get this, the way he explains it just doesnt seam be something i can understand. how can they be compatible? when i think i've understood it all i can think is that he should find another word then free-will, because its confusing to use it in the way he is intending it.
he's basically saying that our 'free' choices are going to lead to an out come that is unchangeable? so what? how is that compatible with determinism?
the 'man falling down an elevator shaft' analogy just says to me that, the outcome of the man falling is determined. but the man doesnt know what it is, so it is worth him trying any. that doesnt make any sense to me. thats just like saying 'believe in free will even tho its not strictly true because your life will be better for it
The man is going down in any world. That outcome cannot be determined by him, but whether or not he will be living or dead at the end of the ride can to some extent by determined by him. That is why it makes sense to try.
Other philosophers see free will as the power to do stuff that we normally consider impossible, this is where he differs. His idea of free will is our capacity to avoid harm and enhance well being. In a deterministic world that is what we are 'determined' to do. The scientific and technological achievements that give us the capacity to do so much our ancestors could not, are all the implications of this free-will. Our capacity to express our freedom has evolved, thus 'freedom evolves'.
see thats what i dont get. cant it be determined by him? i think that what ever he thought of on the way down was the product of something that happend to him before hand. after all, when the out come has happend (say he splats dead!) then thats whats happened and its because of what came before it which was always gonna be the same.
i guess this makes me a hard determenist huh?? lol
so yes i think 'it makes sense to try' but thats not saying he had free will to try, thats different. i think he had no ability to change wether he would try and in what way when this happened because that too had been determined!
does that make sense?
Yes, it makes sense. And what he is saying that the conclusion that he is thus not free is incorrect. His choices too are deterministically derived so he is not free. But what determines these choices? In a deterministic world, he is a deterministic entity. Which begs the question, what is this entity determined to do? To avoid harm and enhance well being. That determines his choices. And if free-will is our capacity to avoid harm and enhance well-being, then free will underlines those choices..
..well why does it make any difference whether we could have made any other choice at the time we made it? We made the choice in the same spirit that we always choose. With the same idea in the back of our mind – to avoid harm and enhance well being. The memory of the past choices and their outcome can inform our future choices, thus making us better more fine tunes deterministic agents, thus freedom evolves. As you can see, choice is not necessary component for free will.
if free will is determenistic aslo then whats the point in using the word free will? or compatibalism?.
saying we have free will to do what we want but at the same time are 'free' choices are also determined seams like a contradiction to me.
if your choices are constrained by what come before (in a completely deterministic fashion) then why call them free at all? whats the point?
again, i find hard and soft determinism to be a difference in what words mean, nothing else.
In a deterministic world, our free choices are determined by us not determined for us.
i dont really see the difference, and thats the problem.
You don't? Is it not obvious? Having your choices determined for you like being a robot that is pre-programmed to do certain actions. It looks intelligent, but that is an illusion, the real intelligence is elsewhere. The example Dennet uses is the digger wasp.
Having your own choices determined by you, is like being programmed to be thoughtful and reflective, thus the capacity for choice. That is we.
say i punch a robot. the robot is programed to punch back. the robot here is not showing free will.
now say the robot is programmed to punch back or not, and the choice is left up to the robot, whatever he decides to do he has used free will.
but now…
what if the robot had another program built in that he would not punch the first 9 people to punch him but every 10th person to punch him he must punch back. could you say he has a free choice? …….
if the initial choice is to punch back or not. surely its only a free choice if the decision isnt constrained by anything.
as people we can make decisions but there always constrained by something else.
everything in my life up till this morning would inform my decision to skip breakfast today rather be late for work!
i cant see how that decision to skip breakfast was 'freely' made by me?
I do not understand this question. There are tow programs running on the robot at the same time? I do not think that is what you are referring to. You are talking about a simple program, in which the robot punched back every 10th person. That is definitely not free will. Assuming that punching is all that the robot could do, the robot must have a preferable state it aspires to reach by punching (win a boxing match?) and its decision to punch or not, must be driven by this. Now it has some..
..semblance of free will. Free will requires an entity to be able to move to a more preferable state from the currently less preferable state that it is in. The chess program has this sense of preference. It recognizes the state it is in as a game not won and tries to move the game to a more preferred situation, either a win or at least a draw. A program for free will is a program biased for preference.
In the case of the robot, the initial choice to punch back or not is not free will. It is not a case of the decision not being constrained. It is not making a decision at all. The decision was made by the programmer. Free-will in decision making does not mean making decisions free-from constraints. It means making our own decisions rather than having someone else decide for us.
@mowgli123456789 I don't either. It's as if he is using the argument of complexity to say when the software program gets complex enough we can switch magically from causal to free will. You can make 'Deep Blue' or the Cray computer a million times bigger and faster; but at it's heart it is totally predictable (even if you try to program in unpredictability). So I still think his idea of free will has not escaped classical determinism. It just says accept it.
yes, thank you. exactly my point.
yes, we avoid harm and go after the good. so?
the fact that we act like this now is determined, which of 2 different 'harms' we avoid is determined. which 'good' we go after is determined. its just more complex now.
if you ask me compatibilists need to find a different word then 'free will' because in most people already have a definition for the word 'free' in their minds and it doesnt line up with it being constrained by anything.
The state of the universe, from instant to instant, is never the same. Yes, we are made up of the same atoms as exist everywhere in the universe, but in us they are put together to make you, me, the person. As persons, we have the freedom to choose. We do not need to attribute this ability to a 'sky hook' which connects us to a universal 'res cogitans.' Evolution has designed an intelligent being and (like Brunelleschi's crane) it gives us that extension–the ability to predict the future.
Predict the future? I am not sure about that. Understand the past yes. And understanding the past helps us deal with the future better, also true. But it sees stretching to say it actually helps us predict the future. Evolution makes no prophecies.
Thanks for the correction. On second thought, it seems to me a bit of an ambitious proposition to suggest that we actually predict anything about the future. I guess we can be somewhat accurate in predicting the outcomes of some experiments in science. As individuals in the world, we can try to project as many possible scenarios of events which haven't yet happened. There is a quality about emergent phenomena that sets the stage for either further natural or cognitive selective processes.
can anyone help? im still not sure i understand (or agree with) his reasons for saying that its pointless to think about re-living conditions precisley the same because we learn nothing.
ive always thought of it like that. i think that if the conditions were 100% as they were when i woke up this morning i would always have choosen to skip breakfast. im not sure if he's is saying this isnt true or not?
any ideas?
I have good reason to agree with what he says here. If conditions where exactly the way they where, then indeed you would not even be aware that the situation is repeating itself, because in the original, you did not have a memory of going through the same motions. When people speak about conditions exactly the way they where, they are usually speaking about an extremely similar circumstance.
yes. its not that im disagreeing. its just that i dont fully see what his point is?
all im getting from this, and your comment, is that its not a viable way of testing determinism or free will by using the 'if the conditions were the same!' senario, which i completely agree with. im just not sure why he is saying that its actaully not true! that if conditions theoretically could be done the same the result would be the same. i believe it would. maybe i understand him wrong tho?
I am not understanding your question. Anyway we are not testing determinism here. He is pointing to the fact that determinism and free-will are compatible.
sorry im not putting this into words very well.
i guess im just trying to be honest and admit that as much as im trying to get this, the way he explains it just doesnt seam be something i can understand. how can they be compatible? when i think i've understood it all i can think is that he should find another word then free-will, because its confusing to use it in the way he is intending it.
he's basically saying that our 'free' choices are going to lead to an out come that is unchangeable? so what? how is that compatible with determinism?
the 'man falling down an elevator shaft' analogy just says to me that, the outcome of the man falling is determined. but the man doesnt know what it is, so it is worth him trying any. that doesnt make any sense to me. thats just like saying 'believe in free will even tho its not strictly true because your life will be better for it
The man is going down in any world. That outcome cannot be determined by him, but whether or not he will be living or dead at the end of the ride can to some extent by determined by him. That is why it makes sense to try.
Other philosophers see free will as the power to do stuff that we normally consider impossible, this is where he differs. His idea of free will is our capacity to avoid harm and enhance well being. In a deterministic world that is what we are 'determined' to do. The scientific and technological achievements that give us the capacity to do so much our ancestors could not, are all the implications of this free-will. Our capacity to express our freedom has evolved, thus 'freedom evolves'.
see thats what i dont get. cant it be determined by him? i think that what ever he thought of on the way down was the product of something that happend to him before hand. after all, when the out come has happend (say he splats dead!) then thats whats happened and its because of what came before it which was always gonna be the same.
i guess this makes me a hard determenist huh?? lol
so yes i think 'it makes sense to try' but thats not saying he had free will to try, thats different. i think he had no ability to change wether he would try and in what way when this happened because that too had been determined!
does that make sense?
Yes, it makes sense. And what he is saying that the conclusion that he is thus not free is incorrect. His choices too are deterministically derived so he is not free. But what determines these choices? In a deterministic world, he is a deterministic entity. Which begs the question, what is this entity determined to do? To avoid harm and enhance well being. That determines his choices. And if free-will is our capacity to avoid harm and enhance well-being, then free will underlines those choices..
..well why does it make any difference whether we could have made any other choice at the time we made it? We made the choice in the same spirit that we always choose. With the same idea in the back of our mind – to avoid harm and enhance well being. The memory of the past choices and their outcome can inform our future choices, thus making us better more fine tunes deterministic agents, thus freedom evolves. As you can see, choice is not necessary component for free will.
if free will is determenistic aslo then whats the point in using the word free will? or compatibalism?.
saying we have free will to do what we want but at the same time are 'free' choices are also determined seams like a contradiction to me.
if your choices are constrained by what come before (in a completely deterministic fashion) then why call them free at all? whats the point?
again, i find hard and soft determinism to be a difference in what words mean, nothing else.
In a deterministic world, our free choices are determined by us not determined for us.
i dont really see the difference, and thats the problem.
You don't? Is it not obvious? Having your choices determined for you like being a robot that is pre-programmed to do certain actions. It looks intelligent, but that is an illusion, the real intelligence is elsewhere. The example Dennet uses is the digger wasp.
Having your own choices determined by you, is like being programmed to be thoughtful and reflective, thus the capacity for choice. That is we.
say i punch a robot. the robot is programed to punch back. the robot here is not showing free will.
now say the robot is programmed to punch back or not, and the choice is left up to the robot, whatever he decides to do he has used free will.
but now…
what if the robot had another program built in that he would not punch the first 9 people to punch him but every 10th person to punch him he must punch back. could you say he has a free choice? …….
if the initial choice is to punch back or not. surely its only a free choice if the decision isnt constrained by anything.
as people we can make decisions but there always constrained by something else.
everything in my life up till this morning would inform my decision to skip breakfast today rather be late for work!
i cant see how that decision to skip breakfast was 'freely' made by me?
I do not understand this question. There are tow programs running on the robot at the same time? I do not think that is what you are referring to. You are talking about a simple program, in which the robot punched back every 10th person. That is definitely not free will. Assuming that punching is all that the robot could do, the robot must have a preferable state it aspires to reach by punching (win a boxing match?) and its decision to punch or not, must be driven by this. Now it has some..
..semblance of free will. Free will requires an entity to be able to move to a more preferable state from the currently less preferable state that it is in. The chess program has this sense of preference. It recognizes the state it is in as a game not won and tries to move the game to a more preferred situation, either a win or at least a draw. A program for free will is a program biased for preference.
In the case of the robot, the initial choice to punch back or not is not free will. It is not a case of the decision not being constrained. It is not making a decision at all. The decision was made by the programmer. Free-will in decision making does not mean making decisions free-from constraints. It means making our own decisions rather than having someone else decide for us.
@mowgli123456789 I don't either. It's as if he is using the argument of complexity to say when the software program gets complex enough we can switch magically from causal to free will. You can make 'Deep Blue' or the Cray computer a million times bigger and faster; but at it's heart it is totally predictable (even if you try to program in unpredictability). So I still think his idea of free will has not escaped classical determinism. It just says accept it.
yes, thank you. exactly my point.
yes, we avoid harm and go after the good. so?
the fact that we act like this now is determined, which of 2 different 'harms' we avoid is determined. which 'good' we go after is determined. its just more complex now.
if you ask me compatibilists need to find a different word then 'free will' because in most people already have a definition for the word 'free' in their minds and it doesnt line up with it being constrained by anything.