Harvard CMSA
12/9/2020 Colloquium
Speakers: Manuel Blum and Lenore Blum (Carnegie Mellon)
Title: What can Theoretical Computer Science Contribute to the Discussion of Consciousness?
Abstract: The quest to understand consciousness, once the purview of philosophers and theologians, is now actively pursued by scientists of many stripes. We study consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science. This is done by formalizing the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, and others. We give a precise formal definition of a Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), also called Conscious AI, in the spirit of Alan Turing’s simple yet powerful definition of a computer. We are not looking for a complex model of the brain nor of cognition but for a simple model of (the admittedly complex concept of) consciousness.
After formally defining CTM, we give a formal definition of consciousness in CTM. We then suggest why the CTM has the feeling of consciousness. The reasonableness of the definitions and explanations can be judged by how well they agree with commonly accepted intuitive concepts of human consciousness, the range of related concepts that the model explains easily and naturally, and the extent of the theory’s agreement with scientific evidence
Source
It's becoming clearer that with all the brain and consciousness theories out there, the proof will be in the pudding. By this I mean, can any particular theory be used to create a human adult level conscious machine. My bet is on the late Gerald Edelman's Extended Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. The lead group in robotics based on this theory is the Neurorobotics Lab at UC at Irvine. Dr. Edelman distinguished between primary consciousness, which came first in evolution, and that humans share with other conscious animals, and higher order consciousness, which came to only humans with the acquisition of language. A machine with primary consciousness will probably have to come first.